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We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the 
State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its 
dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market 
in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be 
done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French 
policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the 
monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some 
later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when 




We thank compatriots who helped us in Spring and Summer 2004 to better understand the French 
electricity reform as well as the many participants to the SESSA international conference in Cambridge 
(UK) on July 14th (the French Bastille Day), specially D. Newbery and Y. Smeers. Of course all 
opinion expressed and remaining errors are only ours. 
 
*  Coordinator of the European R&D Specific Action SESSA within the European Union 6th 
FP; and Professor at University Paris XI, ADIS-GRJM, 54 boulevard Desgranges, 92331 
Sceaux Cedex, FRANCE. E-mail: jean-michel.glachant@jm.u-psud.fr  
**  Deputy Director of the programme of energy at CNRS (National Centre for Scientific 
Research in France); and Director of research at CIRED, CNRS & EHESS, 45 bis avenue 
de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex, FRANCE. E-mail: 
Dominique.finon@centre-cired.fr 
 
  2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The French electricity reform, framed by successive acts of legislation 
passed in February 2000, January 2003, and August 2004 implementing the 
European directives, is a typical case of reform without industrial restructuring of 
the dominant operator. France is not the only European country in which the 
legislation did not impose significant industrial restructuring on the dominant 
operators (cf. Sweden, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, etc.) alongside the 
few which partially or totally dismantled the state-owned incumbents’ assets and 
privatised them (England and Italy). However, it is a rare instance of a 
“competitive” market having been created around a public monopoly that retained 
all of its industrial assets. What Sweden did was somewhat similar, but with a 
much smaller state-owned incumbent’s market share (50%) (Bergman and von der 
Fehr, 1999). Consequently, the hallmark of the French reform is the development 
of a competitive fringe around an incumbent monopoly (Finon, 2003; Finon and 
Midttun 2004; Glachant, 2003). 
This type of electricity reform must raise a number of questions, some of 
which are quite interesting. What kind of competitive fringe can be built around 
the monopoly without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant 
position? What impacts can this reform process have on the market in which the 
incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant? Can more be done for this reform 
while respecting the framework of the French policy (no industrial restructuring 
and no forced divestiture by the monopolist)? Is this type of reform sustainable or 
transient? Will a larger window open up at some later date for contesting the 
position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes? 
We will address these questions in five parts. In the first part, we will see 
whether foreign competition can, at least potentially, constitute a competitive 
fringe around the French monopoly. Is this monopoly vulnerable to competition 
from abroad? Does the French power grid allow electricity generated in 
neighbouring countries to penetrate the domestic market? Does the French 
monopolist itself export to neighbouring countries? Is this potential for foreign 
competition enhanced by a context of excess generating capacity? Do short-term 
generation costs favour foreign or French producers?  
Having described the strengths and weaknesses of foreign competition 
vis-à-vis the French monopoly, in the second part we will turn to examining some 
competitive provisions imposed on the domestic market to reduce the 
monopolist’s power. These are French and European initiatives, including direct 
measures affecting supply and demand and adjustments to market mechanisms 
and market access. In the third part we will examine whether these various 
measures of competitive encirclement of the monopoly have had a perceptible 
impact on the domestic market, in terms of volume or price. In the fourth part, we 
will examine a scenario in which competitive pressures increase on the monopoly 
at the time of resumption of investment, especially when the French nuclear 
generation capacity is due for renewal. When will investment in generation be 
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relaunched in France, and how will the nuclear capacity be renewed? Who will 
invest, and where? Finally, after observing that no massive investment programs 
can be expected in France during the upcoming decade, and that its practical 
aspects remain very uncertain, we will devote the fifth (and last) part to answering 
the question of what might be done to bolster the competitive framework in the 
highly probable event that France’s policies will remain unaltered (no main 
industrial restructuring or forced divestiture of generation and sales). 
 
II. A QUASI-MONOPOLY IN A TRANSMISSION GRID OPEN TO 
FOREIGN COMPETITION 
 
A domestic monopoly can be challenged from abroad if its transmission 
grid allows power to be imported from neighbouring countries or if it is, itself, 
exporting to those countries. This competition from abroad is all the more intense 
when excess generation capacity exists and when short-term production costs 
favour foreign producers. These special conditions are only partly applicable to 
the situation of France’s electricity monopoly. However, they suffice to create a 
potential for foreign competition. 
France typifies the case of government monopolies. In the electricity 
sector, EDF possess over 90 per cent of generation capacity and 100 per cent of 
the transmission grid. EDF operates approximately 95 per cent of the distribution 
network (though these networks belong to local authorities) and supplies about 95 
per cent of the clientele that is ineligible for competition (the other ineligible 
clients draw on local public distributors or non-governmental cooperatives called 
DNN), (EDF, 2003 and 2004; RTE, 2000–2003). EDF is thus Europe’s largest 
electricity utility, with nearly 500 TWh. Aside from EDF, there is only 
approximately 25 TWh of “free” generation, the remainder of independent output 
being either for in-house consumption or resold to EDF in the framework of 
“purchase obligations” associated with the “public service of generation” 
(especially in the case of cogeneration and renewable). 
The electricity transmission grid remains an internal department of EDF, 
but its management and operation have been separated from EDF’s chain of 
command and placed under the direct control of the independent regulator CRE 
(the Energy Regulatory Commission). The regulator monitors and guarantees the 
separation on the books and the transmitter’s autonomy (including such elements 
as the investment program, financing, and prices). In practice, the French 
transmission grid has been essentially run as an independent firm, and there have 
been no complaints from large consumers or EDF competitors contesting its 
impartiality (CRE, 2003 and 2004). 
Since the transmission system operator does not collude with the 
dominant generator, the output of EDF’s quasi-monopoly feeds into a network 
that is open under the European directives and the generator is thus not protected 
against imports from abroad. On its four borders (Germany, Belgium, England, 
and Spain), where import capacity can be defined with the ETSO methodology, 
  4 
this capacity reaches a guaranteed 10,350 MW during the winter. As to the two 
borders (Switzerland and Italy) on which maximal import capacity cannot be 
defined with the same degree of precision, it may be said to approximately equal 
the export capacity (from France), particularly with over 2400 MW of import 
capacity guaranteed from Switzerland (IEA, 2004). With peak winter demand in 
France reaching about 80,000 MW (exports account for approximately 13 per cent 
of this), total guaranteed imports of around 14,000 MW thus equal about 20 
per cent of mean domestic demand (70 GW).  
Since the size of the eligible market was approximately 1/3 of the French 
domestic market until 2004, and is over 2/3 as of July 1, 2004, France’s 
guaranteed physical import capacity surpassed 50 per cent of the eligible market 
before 2004 and is about 30 per cent since July 2004. This physical import 
capacity is all the more accessible to foreign initiatives since there is no (or nearly 
no) congestion to import in France. Furthermore, the portion of the French market 
open to foreign competition between 1999 and 2004 was industrial customers, 
who represent the demand that is most price sensitive and most liable to buy from 
foreign producers. 
 
Table 1. The Opening up of the French Market  
 Threshold Number of 
eligibles 
Market Share 
February 1999: 40 GWh 450 22 % 
February 2000: 16 GWh 1 400 30 % 
February 2003 7 GWh 3 100 37 % 
July 2004 All non-
households 
3 500 000 68 % 
 
Apart from this, the French monopoly is also subject to competition from 
foreign generators in all markets into which EDF exports. These exports are 
considerable, since EDF is the leading European exporter with over 70 TWh 
(approximately 15 per cent of its generation). Overall, in light of its export 
activities and the openness of its transmission grid, EDF is today a domestic 
monopoly that is subject to potential foreign competition for a large volume of 
provision (at least 150 TWh).  
This situation of potential competition on the borders of the French 
monopoly is compounded by the existence of excess generation capacity in France 
and in most of the countries connected to France’s transmission grid. Even during 
the peak demand in the winter of 2003–2004, five of these six border countries 
showed “real” excess capacity (power stations in operation) of at least 10 per cent 
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Table 2. French electricity imports and exports in 2001 (in GWh) 
 
 Exports Imports Net Exports
Belgium 11 651 204 11 447
Germany 14 924 542 14 382
Italy 18 030 459 17 571
Spain 6 768 1 242 5 526
Switzerland 9 839 1 816 8 023
United Kingdom 11 522 208 11 314
Others 127 – 127
Total 72 861 4 471 68 390
Source: IEA “France Report” (June 2004) 
According to studies by the French grid operator RTE, this excess 
capacity during the winter peak in Continental Western Europe (estimated at 12 
GW above the UCTE’s 5 per cent reserves in 2004) could persist until 2008 (when 
it would decline to 7 GW) before disappearing in 2009 [RTE, 2004]. At the 
beginning of 2005, French TSO said that this over capacity could end one year in 
advance. 
Nonetheless, even in times of excess capacity, potential competition from 
foreign producers does not pose a serious threat to French generation who obtains 
90 to 95 per cent of their provision from nuclear and hydro. Of course, with nearly 
80 per cent of its electricity being generated by nuclear reactors, the French 
nuclear system has not reached the limits of its capacity (less than 83 % at full 
output per year—average nuclear performance). But this does not materially affect 
its short-term costs (fuel plus operation & maintenance). French nuclear power 
can thus easily confront any “price war” launched by the traditional thermal power 
capacity of foreign producers, in particular from Britain, Germany, and Spain.  
In May 2004, J. Bower estimated the short-term cost of traditional 
nuclear power in Great Britain at 2/3 that of the coal- and gas-fired and combined-
cycle generation technology already in operation (Bower 2004). The French 
Ministry of Industry set it at only half (13 vs. 25 euros) in its 2007 scenario 
(DGEMP, 2003). French nuclear variable short- run costs at only 8 euros 
constitute a strong deterrent to any foreign thermal generator (IGF-CGM 2004). 
Since the French set of nuclear plants is managed to serve both the base load and 
the mid base load on a daily basis and operates in strong cooperation with hydro 
plants, the threat of the French short-run costs on potential competitors is really 
strong. Only Swiss hydropower could easily penetrate the French market in terms 
of its short-term costs, but prefers to sell into much more lucrative markets (such 
as Italy). 
To conclude, there does indeed exist a potential for foreign competition 
on France’s borders, both because of France’s sizable exports into neighbouring 
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countries (over 70 TWh) and because its transmission grid is capable of importing 
a large proportion of eligible consumers’ demand (between 1/3 and 1/2). 
However, to a large extent this competition remains limited to a potential, despite 
the excess capacity still in place, since the short-term costs of French nuclear 
power cannot be challenged by the short-term costs of foreign thermal generation. 
What foreign competition can actually bring to France is a “ceiling price” which 
can restrain French prices at the level set in neighbouring countriesfrom jumping 
over the foreign generation costs border. What foreign competition cannot deliver 
is to oblige EDF to sell at its own French generation costs.  
 
III. PROVISIONS FOR MITIGATING MONOPOLY POWER ON THE 
FRENCH MARKET 
 
Since foreign competition on the borders of France’s domestic market 
remains largely in the realm of the potential, we need to take a look at what 
competitive initiatives have been taken to mitigate monopoly power on this 
market, whether by direct action on supply or demand (divestiture of assets, 
electricity release, procurement auctioning, etc.) or on market mechanisms and 
market access (power exchange, balancing mechanism, transmission capacity 
auctions, etc.).  
The presence of a vertical and horizontal industrial monopoly does not 
leave much room for the introduction of competition. Nonetheless, several 
margins remained available in France outside of EDF. These margins were 
broadened by regulatory provisions (from both the French regulator and European 
Commission) and by private initiatives (such as the creation of the Powernext 
electricity exchange). 
 




EDF 91% Nuclear, hydropower, coal, HFO, other 
technologies 
Autoproducers 3.0% Mostly gas co-generators 
CNR 2.8% Hydropower 
SNET, Soprolif, Sodelif 1.2% Coal 
SHEM 0.3% Hydropower 
Small hydro producers 0.6% Hydropower 
Others 1.1% Diverse technologies 
Total 100%  
Source: IEA “France Report” (June 2004) 
 
Several “independent generation” sources were progressively spun off 
from EDF and associated with foreign operators (Electrabel, Endesa). These are 
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CNR (run-of-river hydro, 16 TWh), SNET (thermal, 8 TWh) and SHEM 
(reservoir hydro, 2 TWh). In 2004, Electrabel, which is principally active in 
Belgium (at whose border a guaranteed import capacity into France of nearly 3000 
MW exists) was able to expand its participation in French hydro (CNR and 
SHEM) before negotiating an agreement to jointly operate power plants with EDF 
giving it access to nearly 1000 MW of nuclear power in France. For example, 
Electrabel’s current stated goal is 10 per cent penetration into the eligible French 
market (30 TWh by 2007). 
Also, remaining on the supply side, the European competition authority 
required that, in exchange for its acquisition of a stake in the German ENBW, 
EDF allows an electricity release, called VPP (Virtual Power Plants). These VPP, 
which cover a total of 6000 MW, entered into effect in January 2002 and will 
continue until at least the end of 2006, at which time the European Commission 
will decide whether they should be extended in light of the competitive situation 
of the French market. VPP are built around the auctioning of three products: VPP 
baseload (8 euros per MWh withdrawn plus a fixed premium sold at auction); 
VPP Peak (23 to 26 euros per MWh withdrawn plus a fixed premium sold at 
auction); and PPA (basic supply between November 1 and March 31 sold at 
auction price). The durations of these products vary (between three months and 
three years), but the most common is annual (accounting for 2500 MWh sold). 
Since the intervention by the regulator in July 2002, the French exchange 
Powernext has directly managed the daily allotments of the suppliers’ VPP to the 
transmitter RTE. The generator EDF is only informed of the total volume for each 
hour of these daily allotments. 
On the demand side, the French regulator has increased competitive 
openness on the market of eligible clients by requiring that RTE replaces grid 
losses (13 TWh) by an auction mechanism open to all (producers and traders). 
Furthermore, in February 2003 more than one hundred French distributors 
independent of EDF (the DNNs) became eligible to make their own wholesale 
purchases of energy (totalling approximately one TWh). Aside from these two 
measures, all other major competitive changes to demand issue from the 
legislative schedule for expanding the eligible market (22 per cent of the domestic 
market in 1999 = 90 TWh; 30 per cent in 2000; 37 per cent in 2003; and 68 
per cent in 2004 = 290 TWh). From July 2004 the distribution grid losses entered 
in the same auction mechanism as the transmission grid. 
Besides these direct measures affecting supply and demand, other 
measures have organised or consolidated competitive market mechanisms and 
market access. The most important of these measures at the beginning of the 
reform was the French regulator’s neutralization of the conduct of the transmitter 
RTE, which remained an internal department of EDF. The French regulator, 
created by legislation in February 2000, did not obtain full power over the 
transmitter. The transmitter’s rates are proposed by the regulator and can be 
rejected, but not modified, by the minister (this led to a “cold war” over rates 
which lasted until July 2002). However, the regulator’s power was adequate to 
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ensure a true autonomy of the transmitter, given the active support of its 
management (the Director of RTE is not nominated by the president of EDF and 
does not take orders from him).  
Since the French grid features little congestion either at the incoming 
border or internally, access to it from foreign producers does not present major 
difficulties a priori. This is even more the case because the rate for access to the 
French transmission grid covers all network and systems expenses (fixed costs, 
losses, auxiliary services, internal congestion) with a single “postage stamp” paid 
entirely by consumers (G = 0; L = 100%). Subsequent to the European agreement 
on the cross border fee, the French regulator incorporated it into the grid access 
postage stamp. Consequently, for foreign generators, access to the transmission 
network for importing into France is essentially open and free (aside from 
imbalances). 
Imbalances settlement first occurred in the framework of a quasi-
exclusive supply contract held by EDF that was priced at a fixed rate (for 
example, in summer negative imbalances at 23–26 euros and positive imbalances 
at 8 euros). The regulator required that this procedure be changed to an adjustment 
mechanism open to all offers (independent generators and cogenerators, foreign 
generators, consumers). This new mechanism is more competitive than the 
previous arrangement in France, even though it does not create an energy spot 
market. Since 2003 it has operated with two price differentials (one upward and 
another downward), each of which includes a 20 per cent penalty on top of the 
mean cost assumed by the transmitter. To assign a value to the imbalances that 
help the system operator (RTE) reach equilibrium, the French mechanism is to 
compensate them at the Day Ahead price from the Powernext electricity 
exchange.  
This French electricity exchange was created in 2001 by the French-
Belgian-Dutch financial market Euronext (1/3 of the capital) in cooperation with a 
consortium of three transmitters (French RTE, Belgian Elia, and Dutch Tennet: 18 
per cent of the capital) and the participation of five European energy suppliers 
including the electrical concerns EDF, Electrabel, and Endesa (20 per cent 
combined). Limited to Day Ahead for the first two and a half years, Powernext 
opened a futures market for monthly, quarterly, and annual (up to two years) 
trading in June 2004. This exchange has close links to the French transmitter, and 
the Chairman of the Board of Powernext is none other than the Director of the 
RTE’s “power system department”. In particular, the French transmitter 
guarantees that it will carry all Day Ahead and Futures transactions concluded on 
the exchange. Other technical and commercial links bind the transmitter to the 
exchange. These affect the allotment of the VPP, the allotment of other trades 
between operators for settling imbalances, and the establishment of the value of 
imbalances by the transmitter. All of these links are supported by the French 
regulator.  
Also, the transmitter manages a mechanism for allotting transfers of Day 
Ahead “blocks” between operators on the OTC market. As of the end of 2002, the 
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regulator required that a half dozen intraday windows for transferring blocks 
between operators on the OTC market be opened by the transmitter.  
Finally, competitive mechanisms were established for allocating 
transmission capacity on the line connecting France and England. They cover all 
timeframes, from intraday to annual. Furthermore, the French and British 
transmitters can also trade reserves across this same power line, and they are 
working on opening it up to supplying each other’s domestic imbalance 
adjustment mechanisms. This is the most competitive of France’s international 
borders. On the other borders, the French transmitter prioritises France’s exports 
(operators having used less than 75 per cent of retained capacity lose their priority 
status in the event of congestion). That rule obviously favours an incumbent 
exporter with an existing portfolio of stable export contracts [IGF-CGM 2004]. In 
the case of Italy, until 2004 a pro rata system allocated interconnection capacity 
quotas to eligible Italian clients on the basis of their previous consumption. As to 
the interconnections with England, Belgium, and Italy, the French transmitter 
cooperates with its foreign counterparts to measure and allocate export capacity. 
On the Spanish, German, and Swiss borders this type of cooperation was rejected 
by the foreign partners or the regulatory authorities. However, the Spanish market 
OMEL and the Powernext exchange continue to work on linking their Day Ahead 
markets, including a mechanism for allocating interconnection capacity. 
Cooperation is growing among France, Belgium and Netherlands to establish an 
“harmonized” framework for the operation of their grids and PXs. 
All of these provisions, aimed at surrounding the French monopoly with 
a “competitive circle”, can facilitate the exercise of foreign competition on the 
French market (notably access to the transmission grid and use of the 
interconnection capacity, the opening of an exchange, and a new balancing 
mechanism). However, these provisions cannot increase the competitive potential 
of foreign operators. Only the divestiture of generation facilities (CNR, SHEM, 
and SNET) and the VPP could bring additional competitive supply to stimulate 
the domestic market. Therefore what results have been obtained with this reform? 
 
IV. THE VOLUME AND PRICE EFFECTS ON THE FRENCH MARKET 
 
After more than five years after the beginning of the competitive reform 
in France, we should be able to identify the main impacts on volumes and prices. 
We specifically seek to evaluate whether the competitive fringe has truly caught 
on in France, and what impact it may have had in terms of volumes and prices on 
the “monopolistic heart” of the French market. 
 
A. Volume effects 
 
We can evaluate the French electricity reform on the basis of several 
volume effects. In the first instance, we are interested in the origin of the 
electricity resources of EDF’s competitors (independent production? imports? 
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VPP?) and then in the use they make of them (sales to eligible clients or the 
transmission grid? re-export? or…resale to EDF?). We will subsequently examine 
the evolution of the share of the market of eligible clients for EDF and its 
competitors. We will finish with some measures of concentration in the different 
parts of the French market and of France’s competitive fringe. 
 
Table 4. French electricity imports and exports from 1999 to 2003 (in TWh)  
 Imports Exports Net Exports 
Year 1999  5  68  63 
Year 2000  3.3  73  70 
Year 2001  4.2  73  69 
Year 2002  3.8  81  77 
Year 2003  7  73  66 
2003/2002 (%) +90 % -10% -14% 
Source: RTE (French gridTSO) 
 
The relative weight of independent generation, imports, and the VPP in 
competition with EDF can be identified using data published by the transmitter 
and the regulator. After the opening of the French market, between 1999 and 
2003, potential foreign competition did not result in an overall increase of imports 
into France, nor did exports diminish to any great degree. During these first years, 
imports remained at between 0.75 and 1.5 per cent of total domestic consumption, 
which rose from 431 TWh (in 1999) to 467 TWh (in 2003), while the balance of 
French exports during 2000–2002 reached a historic high (75 to 80 TWh). 
However, from 2003 a substantial increase in imports (+3.2 TWh) and decrease in 
exports (-8 TWh) have been observed. A part of it could be attributable to 
exceptional climatic conditions that did not recur in 2004. 
Data from the regulator is more precise (CRE, 2003 and 2004). They 
reveal that the resources used by all EDF competitors on French territory evolved 
from a total of 1800 GWh per month in September 2001 to 7200 GWh per month 
in March of 2004 (an increase of 400 per cent). 
If we base our comparison on the same month, we see that between 
March 2003 and March 2004 independent generation contributed little to this 
increase in the volume of resources, while imports added between 500 GWh and 
1000 GWh per month. Thus, during the first quarter of 2004, imports by 
competitors of EDF reached the highest level observed over the past three years. 
However, the bulk of their resources continue to be supplied by VPP, which 
contributed nearly 4000 GWh in March 2004 (approximately 55 per cent of total 
resources). 
Use of these resources by EDF competitors has also featured several 
significant fluctuations. First, only in February 2003 did (direct and indirect) sales 
to eligible consumers exceed sales to the transmitter RTE (to cover grid losses) 
and re-exports to other countries. In March of 2004, these sales to eligible 
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consumers reached a monthly record of 3000 GWh. However, as of October 2003, 
total sales for RTE losses and re-exports caught up with sales to eligible 
consumers and, in January 2004 and March 2004, also attained a record level of 
3000 GWh per month. On the other hand, as of July 2003, total sales by EDF 
competitors fell substantially below their available resources, with a monthly gap 
ranging between 500 GWh and 1200 GWh.  
 
Table 5. EDF competitors’ business as seen by the grid operators (1st 
Quarter 2004)  
(sold to >>) Eligible Customers Grid Losses Exports EDF Total 
In GWh 8200 3500 5900 2700 20,300 
In % 41 % 17 % 29 % 13 % 100 % 
 
 
Table 6. EDF competitors’ resources as seen by the grid operators (1st 
Quarter 2004)  
coming from >> Independent 
Generation 
VPP Imports // Total 
In TWh 3900 11,400 5000 // 20,300 
In % 19 % 56 % 25 % // 100 % 
Source: Rough approximations deduced from data published by the French 
Regulator CRE 
 
This gap reveals that EDF competitors do not sell all their resources to 
French domestic demand or export, and that they thus finally resell all their 
surpluses to EDF. If this trend from the second quarter of 2003 and the first 
quarter of 2004 were to persist, questions will arise concerning the effectiveness 
of the VPP for creating an alternative competitive supply on the French market; as 
said –for the first time- a French official report in Fall 2004 (IGF-CGM 2004). In 
March of 2004, re-sales to EDF reached 1200 GWh, or over 30 per cent of the 
month’s VPP resources. Furthermore, informal “not to be quoted and thus 
anonymous” sources suggested that actual resale to EDF by the competitive fringe 
is underestimated by the French regulator statistics. The official report (IGF-CGM 
2004) notes that EDF buys about 26 TWh on the French wholesale market 
(mainly on the OTC). Finally, the last of the major changes that characterised the 
first quarter of 2004 is that imports by EDF competitors reached the record level 
of 5 TWh per quarter, constituting 25 per cent of their total resources. 
Another volume-based indicator of the French reform is the evolution of 
sales on the market of eligible clients. This is known as the “switching rate”. 
Aside from auctions to cover grid losses, the penetration of EDF competitors that 
began in the autumn of 2001, when they skirted 10 per cent of the eligible market, 
  12 
surged to 16 per cent (in volume) in the spring of 2002. This level was not 
surpassed during the 12 subsequent months (April 2002 to March 2003). A new 
high was reached in the second quarter of 2003 when this market share attained 
nearly 19 per cent—followed by a decline to 16 per cent in January 2004. With 
the opening of the eligible market to all non-domestic consumers in July 2004, the 
market share of EDF competitors continued to fall to about 11% market share in 
late October 2004 (before taking into account the distribution grid losses auction), 
since the size of the eligible market rose from 173 TWh to 318 TWh. After six 
months of the new opening about 22,000 of the 3,500,000 new eligible consumers 
had changed supplier (1 to 2 TWh?). 
 
Figure 1. Market Share gained by New Entrants in France with or without 
losses (September 2001 to January 2004)  
 
Source: IEA France report (June 2004) 
 
The final volume-based indicators that characterize the evolution of the 
French market and its competitive fringe represent concentration. The 
concentration of sales indices documented by the French regulator (CRE, 2004) 
suggests that EDF’s net activities neither draw power from the Powernext 
exchange nor cover the transmitter’s losses or balancing entities on the OTC 
market. Unfortunately, the French regulator’s statistics are special in defining 
what EDF is and isn’t. They don’t consider foreign subsidiaries of EDF as part of 
EDF itself, in particular EDF’s trading arm once named Louis Dreyfus. 
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Nevertheless, these three activities are not very concentrated among EDF 
competitors and EDF foreign subsidiaries, either (HHI below 800). Conversely, 
on the eligible market, EDF-in-France’s share remains above 80 per cent (but 
below 83 per cent), and, on the export market, near 79 per cent. EDF’s 
competitors and EDF’s foreign subsidiaries are quite highly concentrated within 
their own share of the “non-EDF” segment of the eligible market (HHI of 1618, 
with 90 per cent of sales going to the top five and approximately 35 per cent to the 
biggest, probably Electrabel). However, their concentration is low in exports (HHI 
of 565).  
The French regulator’s indicators (CRE, 2004) of resource concentration 
reveal that EDF controls about 95 per cent of generation (including power 
purchase obligations), but less than 40 per cent of imports into France. EDF 
competitors are highly concentrated in their generation activities (non-EDF HHI 
of 4617) and very little concentrated in all other activities (HHI below 750 for 
purchases on the Powernext exchange and at VPP auctions, for imports, and for 
block purchases on the OTC market).  
The parallelism of the indicators of concentration, sales, and resources 
suggests that competition with EDF on the eligible market owes more to 
independent generation in France than to VPP auctions or imports. The resources 
represented by VPP and imports remain dispersed among many small EDF 
competitors. Logically, this also relates to the dispersal of their sales on the 
Powernext exchange, on the market for grid losses, on the OTC market, and in 
exports. It is a dispersed “competitive fringe”. 
 
B. Price effects 
 
Having established that foreign competition remains largely in the realm 
of the potential and that 75 per cent of the resources of EDF competitors are 
generated in France (independent and VPP), we can now turn to price effects. In 
an environment such as France, characterised by an open and highly 
interconnected transmission grid and excess generation capacity both in the 
interior and at the borders—but with a cost advantage for domestic production—a 
monopolist could allow foreign competitors to fix the price on the wholesale 
market and to eligible clients (to increase own earnings) or undercut the price to 
eligible clients so as to reduce the profitability of entrants. In parallel, this 
monopolist can impose a greater margin on its captive non-eligible clientele. The 
recent French official study (IGF-CGM 2004) modelled Continental Europe 
present situation as a Cournot oligopoly and ran a basic model with both nuclear 
and fossil fuel generation. It shows that an unrestricted monopoly will sell at € 9 
above its long run nuclear costs while a concentrated oligopoly will put it at € 3 to 
€ 5 above these nuclear costs. In this study the actual long-run costs of the existing 
French nuclear plants are given at 30 €/MWh in 2004 (including sales force cost). 
These simplistic scenarios of a “reasoned response to the opening of borders” can 
then be compared to price data. 
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Source: Power In Europe, Platts. 
Between the autumn of 2001 and the spring of 2004, wholesale prices for 
the French baseload indeed appear to coincide with German prices, and are 
sometimes lower (Figure 2; confirmed by the deeper statistical analysis made by 
Armstrong and Galli 2005). These French prices evolve mainly as if the short-
term costs of French plants were very similar to those in Germany. However, in a 
competitive scenario with excess generation capacity and congestion at the French 
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border to enter Germany, French baseload prices should be much closer to the 
short-term costs of French nuclear power than to the short-term costs of German 
traditional thermal power. Indeed, EDF has conventional coal plants (with 20.5 
TWh generated in 2003 by 10.5 GW of capacity after mothballing 5.5 GW) 
setting its marginal costs at about 25 Euros / MWh (a cost used to set the fixed 
term of the VPP “peak” auction). But this is true about 2000 hours a year. During 
most of the rest of the year, EDF’s marginal plants are hydro or nuclear with a 
nuclear short term cost at about 13 Euros / MWh (Fuel cost + marginal and fixed 
cost of O&M) (French Ministry of Industry data: DGEMP 2003) and a nuclear 
marginal cost of 8 euros (IGF-CGM 2004).  
Wholesale prices at one-year maturity also reveal a strong parallel in 
levels and changes between France and Germany, with a slight falling off of 
French prices, especially during the period from 2001 to the first quarter of 2004 
(Platts, June 2004). This suggests that the French dominant player found no 
incentive to play the tougher “price war” that lower nuclear marginal costs could 
permit. In the second half of 2003, a parallel price increase in Germany and 
France sent prices to a more profitable 35 euros per MWh, substantially above the 
French nuclear long term costs. Before July 2004, each one €/MWh increase on 
the French wholesale market could yield about €170 million per year if it could be 
passed on to all of EDF’s eligible customers in France and abroad. In June 2004, 
the EDF’s Chairman stated that its company selling price was definitively going 
towards 35 €/MWh. 
In terms of consumer prices, if we rely on the European Commission’s 
statistics for the group of six Western countries centred on France, French prices 
always ranked among the lowest two countries between 1999 and 2003 (Table 7). 
For the 24 GWh / year big industrial consumers, the French price has been less 
than or equal to 50 €/MWh since 1999 and was the lowest during three of these 
five years. All this time, French prices were below German prices (by € 13 from 
1997 to 1999, by only € 1 in 2000, and again by € 15 in 2003). The French 
incumbent obviously did not exercise its price-setting power to wildly raise prices 
on the domestic market of large eligible clients. The same is true for the 50 MWh 
/ year small professional customers eligible in France as of July 2004. The French 
price was the lowest among these six countries from 1997 to 2002 and the second 
lowest in 2003. For medium-sized domestic customers with 3.5 MWh / year, the 
French price was one of the two lowest from 1997 to 2003. 
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Table 7. Electricity Consumer Prices in 6 European countries 1997-2003 
(January Prices except July 2003; €/MWh)  
 
  24 GWh -  Industrial consumers / Eurostat category IG 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ITA 59 60 53 60 79 71 77 
GER 68 66 63 50 53 53 60 
BEL 58 56 55 55 57 58 56 
SPA 59 52 53 54 49 47 48 
FRA 55 52 50 49 48 49 45 
U-K 60 54 59 54 51 47 43 
  50 MWh -  Industrial consumers / Eurostat category IB 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GER 165 163 162 139 133 131 134 
BEL 147 148 148 143 125 129 122 
ITA 119 119 114 119 87 98 104 
SPA 111 100 98 98 98 99 95 
FRA 100 92 89 87 85 86 83 
U-K 114 109 107 107 94 92 78 
  3.5 MWh -  Domestic consumers / Eurostat category DC 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ITA 167 168 157 150 157 139 147 
GER 127 126 128 119 122 126 125 
BEL 119 119 118 117 118 114 112 
U-K 108 105 102 99 96 97 95 
FRA 101 96 95 93 91 92 89 
SPA 105 95 93 90 86 86 87 
Source: European Commission DG TREN, 3d Benchmarking Report (March 2004)  
 
Of course, a more thorough analysis of electricity prices requires 
separating power costs and grid costs, which are mixed in these European 
statistics. The Third Benchmarking Report of the European Commission offers 
such a rough breakdown of electricity prices into their 3 major components: power 
costs (consisting of energy and capacity costs), grid costs, and supply margin. 
This data (Table 8) confirms that at the beginning of the year 2004 the underlying 
French power price is still lower than Germany’s (by 7 to 10 €/MWh) and seems 
to be the cheapest in this group of six countries for both the 24 GWh and the 50 
MWh consumers. At a level of 28 to 30 €/MWh, the underlying French power 
price is aligned with French official long term nuclear costs (DGEMP, 2003) and 
(IGF-CGM 2004) but doesn’t take into account the peak load energy cost nor the 
balancing cost. Nevertheless the supply margin itself seems to be comfortable at 
10 €/MWh (equal to 36 % of the power costs in the 24 GWh segment) while the 
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cost of sales force with big industrial consumers is said to be about 1 €/MWh 
(IGF-CGM 2004).  
 
Table 8. EU Estimated breakdown of expected consumers prices 2004 
(€/MWh)  
 
(24GWH) Industrial consumers Eurostat category IG 
 Power Grid Costs Supply Margin TOTAL 
ITA 60  13  10  83 € 
BEL 40  25  8  73 € 
GER 35  25  10  70 € 
FRA 28  15  10  53 € 
SPA 38  10  5  53 € 
U-K 30  15  5  50 € 
(50MWH) Industrial consumers Eurostat category IB 
 Power Grid Costs Supply Margin TOTAL 
GER 40 65 20 125 € 
ITA 60 30 25 115 € 
BEL 45 50 20 115 € 
SPA 40 45 10 95 € 
FRA 30 50 10 90 € 
U-K 33 35 10 78 € 
Source: European Commission DG TREN, 3d Benchmarking Report (March 2004) 
 
Table 9. Margin between Domestic and Industrial Prices (€/MWh)  
   Price (DC =3.5 MWh) - (IG=24GWh)  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ITA 108 108 104 90 78 68 70 
GER 59 60 65 69 69 73 65 
BEL 61 63 63 62 61 56 56 
U-K 48 51 43 45 45 50 52 
FRA 46 44 45 44 43 43 44 
SPA 46 43 40 36 37 39 39 
Source: Own calculation on EU data 
 
Such a breakdown is not available for domestic customers. We can only 
calculate a margin between the prices to large industrial consumers and to 
domestic consumers. In France, this margin is one of the two smallest of these six 
countries for all years (Table N9). This suggests that the underlying power price 
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paid by non eligible customers from 1999 to 2003 left little room for an aggressive 
cross-subsidization from domestic to industrial consumers. A further complication 
in calculating this margin comes from the fact that the French government can 
increase the cost of Public Service Obligations (from €1.3 billion in 2003 to €1.7 
billion in 2004) while denying any change to the tariff charged to ineligible 
customers. This increase in obligations in 2004 amounts to 1 to 2 €/MWh 
depending on how it is shared among customers. 
Finally, looking beyond only consumer prices, we may ask about the 
existence of competitive links on the French domestic market between price and 
volume effects—especially of the ability of the French market to respond with 
short term volume changes to wholesale price differentials with neighbouring 
markets. This information is of particular interest in terms of the link with 
England, which is managed by the most competitive of any of France’s 
interconnection arrangements. We do, in fact, observe this type of competitive 
effect in the short run, with flows and counter-flows reaching 12 and 37 GWh per 
day (the equivalent of 6 to 19 hours of daily use of this link’s 2 GW capacity) 
(CRE, 2003). The cumulative effect of these variations in volume over the year 
2003 is remarkable. The reduction in French exports reached 5.6 TWh over that 
year, while imports from England increased by 3.4 TWh, for a total annual change 
of 9 TWh in the balance of exchanges (equivalent to 4500 hours at this link’s full 
capacity in one direction). On the contrary, the French - German interconnection 
is said to be run against any rational wholesale price arbitrage behaviour neither 
from France to Germany nor from Germany to France because of the method used 
to allocate its capacity (IGF-CGM 2004). 
 
V. A CHALLENGE TO THE MONOPOLY WHEN INVESTMENT IN 
GENERATING CAPACITY RESUMES IN FRANCE? 
 
Since foreign competition remains largely in the realm of the potential, 
and domestic competitors have not been able to penetrate very deeply into the 
French market, we must ask whether the resumption of productive investment in 
France could create a credible challenge to the monopoly. This scenario of “an 
investment-driven challenge” involves several aspects. We cannot address them 
all. First we will look at the timing and magnitude of this investment. Then we 
will ask who might do the investing, in what technology, and where. 
These issues may be broached using the forecasts of the French TSO and 
statistics on nuclear power plants. The French transmitter foresees excess capacity 
in Continental Western Europe lasting until 2008. As to the evolution of demand 
in France, the TSO proposes three scenarios in the most recent forecast balance 
sheet for 2006–2015.  
Under these scenarios, the French TSO concludes that, even with 
minimal investment in generation, the risk of a one-hour shortfall is only 1 to 3 
per cent for the year 2006. In 2010, there is a 22 per cent risk of an 11-hour 
shortfall (thus, investment in 1.4 to 4 GW will be necessary before that date). 
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Finally, the risk of an 87-hour shortfall in 2015 is 83 per cent (requiring an 
additional 5 GW between 2010 and 2015). In these typical shortfall scenarios, the 
foreign contribution to the French internal generation peak is assumed having 
been able to decrease enough to make French net exports down to zero. However 
no net French imports are assumed.  
 
Table 10. French TSO scenarios 2010-2020  
French Consumption Growth Rate (Yearly %) 
Until     2010  2010-2015  2015-2020 
Scenario R1       1.4 0.9 0.6 
Scenario R2       1.3 0.9 0.5 
Scenario R3       1.1 0.6 0.3 
   French Consumption (in TWh) 
Year      2010  2015  2020 
Scenario R1       520 544 561 
Scenario R2       513 536 550 
Scenario R3       503 519 527 
Source: Bilan prévisionnel RTE (2006 – 2015) 
 
However, several of the TSO’s other assumptions suggest that there will 
not be very much room for substantial investment before 2015. On the one hand, 
voluntary reductions in demand during the winter peak can be purchased from 
consumers (before the electricity reform there was a voluntary reduction of 3 GW 
during the peak load). On the other hand, EDF’s exports could decline in lockstep 
with new investments abroad as the generation costs of marginal plants 
progressively converge across Continental Europe. EDF could also reactivate old 
thermal plants that have been mothballed (approximately 5 GW). Moreover, U.S. 
nuclear operators have successfully increased the output of reactors that are 
similar to those used in France by five per cent, which would create an additional 
capacity in France equivalent to two or three reactors (3000 MW) before the 
nuclear plants are abandoned. Finally, a series of investments in renewable energy 
(2500–8000 MW by 2007) is provided for in a decree of the French government in 
2003. It will be supplemented between 2010 and 2015 by a prototype of the new 
1600-MW reactor EPR (proposed after the decree of 2003 and the construction of 
which in the west of France, between 2006 and 2011, was officially announced in 
October 2004). 
Under these conditions, major investments in France would only begin 
after the closing of the current nuclear power capacity, i.e. after 2015. If the 
lifespan of nuclear power plants is assumed to be 40 years, EDF will shut down 
nearly 50 GW of capacity between 2017 and 2027 (CEA, 2003). But this scenario 
is far from certain. Many in the nuclear industry maintain that a 50-year lifespan is 
imminently reasonable, on condition that some secondary investments are made 
and, of course, that irreplaceable components (such as the reactor vessel) continue 
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to meet safety requirements. Aside from any disaster scenarios, there is thus a 
range of uncertainty spanning at least a decade concerning the beginning of the 
closure of French nuclear power plants: 2017 or 2027? 
 
Figure 3. French nuclear generation capacity from 2016 to 2039 assuming a 







































Operational nuclear generation capacity (GW/Year)
Nuclear capacity shut down (GW/Year)
Source: CEA (2003) 
 
A second series of unknowns relates to the practical aspects of this 
massive future reinvestment. Will each of the current 63 GW nuclear plants be 
replaced by new nuclear generating capacity? Knowing that mean French 
consumption in 2020 will be approximately 550 TWh, with a winter peak load 
below 90 GW and an annual demand growth rate well below one per cent? 
Moreover, if EDF maintains its existing sales in neighbouring countries (70 to 80 
TWh annually), will the corresponding generation capacity be built in France or 
abroad? Will this be nuclear or traditional thermal? This represents at least 10 GW 
more or less in nuclear capacity. A third series of unknowns lies in the future 
investment behaviour of French nuclear enterprises. It has been definitely said that 
EDF and Areva (the French nuclear fuel processor and reprocessor) will be 
privatised in 2005 (between one-quarter and one-third). In 2010–2020, when 
nuclear reinvestment will really open, both companies could be more private than 
public. How will they behave then when facing a potential €100 billions nuclear 
investment (Glachant 2005)? 
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Finally, will this period of massive investment open a window for the 
entry of new operators, such as the former English “Dash for Gas”? Should we 
expect that future generating capacity will essentially be vertically integrated with 
supply like seen in other countries (Newbery 2000; Joskow 2003)? and, in 
consequence, that investments will be made by suppliers already present on the 
French market? If this vertical integration scenario materializes, only a handful of 
foreign investors can be envisaged. Electrabel, which is targeting ten per cent of 
the French market (35 TWh to 50 TWh in the long term); Endesa, which may 
attain between one quarter and one half of Electrabel’s goal (between 12 and 25 
TWh), and Enel, which could enter the French market on the invitation of EDF 
(notably, by acquiring a share in French nuclear plants) in consideration of EDF’s 
presence in Italy.  
However, the main unknown in vertically integrated investment is not 
from foreign sources, but rather French: Gaz de France. This “national champion” 
of gas is the primary potential competitor to EDF, both in the commercial market 
(with 500,000 consumers) and in the domestic market (with 11 million 
consumers). It is particularly in the area of “Dual Fuel” (joint supply of gas and 
electricity) that Gaz de France has a competitive edge that would be difficult to 
overcome by any potential new entrant. Of course, Gaz de France cannot match 
the position of British Gas – Centrica, since the use of gas is less widespread in 
France than in England (half the consumption) and since EDF is a more solid 
brand nationally than Gaz de France. Nonetheless, as Gaz de France will probably 
never be merged with EDF by the French government, we can easily imagine that 
in time it could achieve at least half of penetration of British Gas – Centrica in 
electricity, or 10–12 per cent of the French market. When added to the market 
shares of foreign electricity concerns, this could put one fifth of the French market 
outside of EDF (100 TWh) and accounted for approximately 18 GW peak 
capacity. But how will all these new producers find the sites required for dozens 
of power plants in France, not to mention the fuel to operate them? and when? 
after 2010–15, when the success of the opening of the retail market (2007) and the 
opening of a new investment window have been established? or before 2010-15, 
and quite soon from now in a “dash for investment” scenario resulting in the 
voluntary addition of new capacity before the former overcapacity has entirely 
been exhausted? 
 
VI. OTHER MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE FRENCH MONOPOLY? 
 
Since a massive reinvestment is not to be expected in France over the 
next decade and the practical aspects of that reinvestment remain very uncertain, 
what can be done to bolster the competitive fringe in the very likely event that 
French policy will not change (no industrial restructuring and no divestiture of 
generation or sales imposed on the national champions) (Bouttes and Trochet, 
2002 and 2004; Finon, 2003; Finon and Midttun 2004)? 
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Doubtlessly, steps could be taken toward unbundling the transmission 
grid (transforming it into an independent entity, owned by a neutral public entity 
like the Caisse des Dépôts) and toward converting the distribution network, which 
does not belong to EDF, into several publicly owned regional bodies (as was 
discussed in the “Upper French corridors” in the autumn of 2002). Regionalised 
unbundling of the distribution network could allow for improved control over the 
quality of service and economic performance by the network owners (local 
governments) and by the regulator. These various unbundling measures could 
facilitate the activities of the competitive fringe but not materially increase them. 
Changes to demand should be anticipated. On one hand, all business 
customers became eligible in July of 2004, and this will be extended to include all 
residential consumers in July of 2007. On the other hand, all public bodies 
(government ministries, municipalities, schools and universities, hospitals, etc.) 
will eventually apply the rules of competitive bidding to obtaining their electricity 
supply, though they can avoid this until 2007, given the August 2004 law and its 
recent interpretation by the French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil 
d’Etat). In the coming years, this could broaden the scope of activity for all 
suppliers wishing to establish themselves in France. In this new environment, it is 
possible that one or two new entrant suppliers will grow (such as Poweo and 
Direct Energie) until their portfolios include 50,000 or 100,000 non-domestic 
clients (2.5–5 TWh) and eventually resell themselves as bridgeheads for larger 
operators (foreign, such as Endesa or Enel, or even French, such as Gaz de 
France). At the end of 2004 these two new entrants had gained about 20,000 
customers. 
On the supply side, the European Commission could maintain, or even 
expand, EDF’s VPP program after 2006. EDF could accept such a measure as a 
demonstration of “European” good faith, especially if the framework of a unified 
market has not progressed enough on the Continent. Some of these additional VPP 
could be relatively informal and consist of bilateral accords, such as the one 
making 1000 MW of EDF’s nuclear power available to Electrabel, or like the 
agreements that EDF discussed with ENEL on several occasions.  
Also, on the supply side, domestic market structures could be shielded 
from any new concentration by the dominant operators. This is particularly 
relevant in the Dual Fuel (or bi-energy, gas plus electricity) market, in which no 
operator who is dominant in one energy form would be allowed to merge with or 
acquire an operator who is dominant in the other. A further variant, on the Italian 
model, would be a new anti-trust rule establishing a ceiling on market share for 
dual fuel: no operator could have more than x per cent of this new market until a 
proven competitive structure had emerged. The feasibility of this anti-trust rule 
could be ensured, ex ante, by a dismantling into regional subsidiaries of the 
dominant suppliers’ operations. This would allow eventual divestiture of market 
shares with limited industrial or social disruption. Such divestitures would, 
moreover, be easier to implement between EDF and Gaz de France, which are 
both publicly owned and national institutions. Furthermore, all activities of all 
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dominant actors, whether in their historical markets or in new ones, could be 
subjected to permanent oversight by a specialised branch of the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (Glachant and Littlechild 2004) in conjunction with 
French and European anti-trust authorities which could back the French energy 
regulator as said by the official report (IGF-CGM 2004). A different approach 
could be to help Gaz de France enter more deeply into the generation of electricity 
by reselling EDF’s mothballed plants. Ideally this 5 GW capacity should be 
auctioned off to any bidder, not only Gaz de France. But an open competitive 
auctioning of EDF plants could be politically infeasible, at least under Chirac’s 
presidency.  
Partial privatisation of EDF and GDF was announced by the French 
government and arranged in the new law in the summer of 2004. It could be 
implemented in 2005 or 2006, covering a tenth to a quarter of their shares. As 
many details still have to be determined, it is too early to foresee all the effects of 
this new policy. Nevertheless, it is certain that this privatisation will be very 
smooth and kept under control by the government and the companies’ managers 
(like ENEL’s privatisation was managed in Italy). To comply with the policy, the 
two companies’ management was shuffled in September 2004 and the new bosses 
will last at least until the end of President Chirac’s term in 2007. Both new bosses 
are “insiders”: EDF got the GDF Chairman and GDF the Prime Minister’s 
assistant.  
This process of privatisation will bring at least more transparency and 
stability in the accounting rules practiced at EDF, after the many changes seen in 
the previous three years (up to €2 or 4 billions per year). Furthermore, EDF’s 
balance sheet still needs to be stabilised and revamped, given the huge liabilities 
still to be addressed with only €20 billions in existing capital. Approximately €10 
billion are needed for transferring EDF pensions into the French national pension 
system. More or less €10 billion in various debt and financial instruments are still 
held exclusively by EDF subsidiaries (notably in Germany and Italy). Some €5 
billion of foreign investment could still have to be written off. Aside from these 
€25 billions in various liabilities, EDF accounts exhibit €24 billion in debt and 
€25 billions in nuclear liabilities (€11 billions for plant decommissioning and €14 
for fuel reprocessing and storage). It explains why the official report to the 
Minister of Finance, Economy and the Industry (Roulet 2004) suggests that the 
actual EDF equity is either nil or negative. 
Finally, French market and market access mechanisms could be 
reinforced or refined. The French balancing mechanism could be opened to 
operators from neighbouring countries, which is currently being prepared by the 
TSO and the French regulator. This mechanism could also be transformed into a 
true energy spot market, backed by competitive procedures for allocating 
interconnection capacity and coordinated with the TSOs in bordering countries. 
The Powernext Day Ahead exchange could be joined with adjoining exchanges 
and directly allot interconnection capacity, as is proposed in the project under 
discussion with Spain, Belgium and Netherlands. However, projects to expand 
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linkages between the French and foreign markets have elicited less than 
enthusiastic responses in some of the neighbouring countries, where they have 
been primarily perceived as a new bridgehead for EDF’s penetration of their 




France undertook in 1999-2000 a unique electricity reform in which the 
state-owned monopoly was not privatised, demolished, or dismantled. 
Nonetheless, we observe the existence of a competitive fringe, foreign and 
domestic, surrounding the old monopoly and its ability to exercise market power. 
Despite the 63 GW of nuclear plants and their low short-run marginal cost of 
generation, French wholesale prices are aligned to those of the alternative 
generated abroad: German traditional thermal power. However, sales prices to 
large eligible French clients often appeared to be the lowest in Western Europe. In 
comparison, sales prices to ineligible domestic clients, which are fixed by the 
French government, could have incorporated a higher margin—at least until 2003, 
when the Public Service Obligation increased and was not fully compensated. 
These elements could coincide with the profile of a public generation 
monopoly hemmed in by a competitive fringe, but they do not portend any radical 
future competitive changes to the structure of the French market. Furthermore, as 
said by the official French report (IGF-CGM 2004) the same picture would 
perfectly fit with the outcome of a Continental Europe generation oligopoly where 
a lonely nuclear generator is not subjected to any competitive threat from other 
nuclear competitors. Such an oligopoly game might result in a substantial 5 
€/MWh margin above the long-run nuclear costs of generation. If radical 
generation capacity realignment can only be expected at the time of the renewal of 
the French nuclear power capacity, it will be a long wait, since less than 4000 
MW will be shut down before 2019…or even 2029 depending on the lifespan of 
these plants. And no new thermal plants will ever be able to oblige a lonely 
French nuclear and hydro generator to sell at its own generation costs (IGF-CGM 
2004).  
While awaiting any kind of distant future and in preparation for the 
opening of the market to domestic clients in 2007, a policy aimed at bolstering the 
competitive fringe could extend the provisions of the electricity release and 
arrange the length and variety of its products to the needs of new suppliers, even 
though the VPP have not yet attracted any alternative operators of substance. 
Mergers between the dominant French gas and electricity concerns could be 
blocked so as to maintain the potential of competition between them, especially in 
the Dual Fuel market. An alternative way could be to resell or to auction off 
EDF’s 5 GW mothballed plants to any buyer including GDF. The competitive 
mechanisms of the French market and access to this market could be reinforced 
and coordinated or aligned with the competitive provisions of neighbouring 
networks and markets. This would increase the openness and transparency of the 
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French market and enhance the credibility of some competitive challenges to the 
national monopoly from foreigners or new entrants. These steps, affecting market 
access and mechanisms, would also contribute to the construction of a wider 
European market on the Continent. 
However, a prolongation of the French policy of “competitive 
encirclement” of the national champion for more one or two decades raises serious 
issues of feasibility and effectiveness. Since it seeks to perpetuate the core of the 
French monopoly’s industrial structures in the face of expanding market forces, 
realisation of a policy of “encirclement by the borders and the fringe” also 
requires a good deal of cooperation from neighbouring countries and the European 
Commission. It is thus based on the premise that everyone wins playing that 
particular game. That is still to be demonstrated to all foreigners and the EU 
because it would open foreign power grids as much as the French grid, and 
foreign markets as much as the French market, while retaining the other structural 
asymmetries between the French and the foreign industry. Many French officials 
and a substantial part of the French elite would like to replay in Western 
Continental Europe the astute Swedish play to enter the Nordic electricity game. 
They still have to find their complacent “Norwegian” partners. The recent French 
official report (IGF-CGM 2004) suggests than a rational continental generators’ 
oligopoly ought not to be afraid of the French nuclear generator since it is not in 
its interest to aggressively fight them.  
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Table 1. The Opening up of the French Market  
 Treshold Number of 
eligibles 
Market Share 
February 1999: 40 GWh 450 22 % 
February 2000: 16 GWh 1 400 30 % 
February 2003 7 GWh 3 100 37 % 
July 2004 All non-
households 
3 500 000 68 % 
 
Table 2. French electricity imports and exports in 2001 (in GWh) 
 Exports Imports Net Exports
Belgium 11 651 204 11 447
Germany 14 924 542 14 382
Italy 18 030 459 17 571
Spain 6 768 1 242 5 526
Switzerland 9 839 1 816 8 023
United Kingdom 11 522 208 11 314
Others 127 – 127
Total 72 861 4 471 68 390
Source: IEA “France Report” (June 2004) 
 




EDF 91% Nuclear, hydropower, coal, HFO, other 
technologies 
Autoproducers 3.0% Mostly gas co-generators 
CNR 2.8% Hydropower 
SNET, Soprolif, Sodelif 1.2% Coal 
SHEM 0.3% Hydropower 
Small hydro producers 0.6% Hydropower 
Others 1.1% Diverse technologies 
Total 100%  
Source: IEA “France Report” (June 2004) 
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Table 4. French electricity imports and exports from 1999 to 2003 (in TWh) 
 Imports Exports Net Exports 
Year 1999  5  68  63 
Year 2000  3.3  73  70 
Year 2001  4.2  73  69 
Year 2002  3.8  81  77 
Year 2003  7  73  66 
2003/2002 (%) +90 % -10% -14% 
Source: RTE (French grid)  
 
Table 5. EDF competitors’ business as seen by the grid operators (1st 
Quarter 2004) 
(sold to >>) Eligible 
Customers 
Grid Losses Exports EDF Total 
In GWh 8200 3500 5900 2700 20,300 
In % 41 % 17 % 29 % 13 % 100 % 






VPP Imports // Total 
In TWh 3900 11,400 5000 // 20,300 
In % 19 % 56 % 25 % // 100 % 
Source: Rough approximations deduced from data published by the French 
regulator (June 2004) 
  29 
Figure 1. Market Share gained by New Entrants in France with or without 
losses (September 2001 to January 2004) 
 
 
Source: IEA France report (June 2004) 
Figure 2. Average base load OTC power prices on a monthly basis 
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Source: Power in Europe, Platts 
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Table 7. Electricity Consumer Prices in 6 European countries 1997-2003  
(January Prices except July 2003; Euros / MWh) 
 
  24 GWh -  Industrial consumers / Eurostat category 
IG 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ITA 59 60 53 60 79 71 77 
GER 68 66 63 50 53 53 60 
BEL 58 56 55 55 57 58 56 
SPA 59 52 53 54 49 47 48 
FRA 55 52 50 49 48 49 45 
U-K 60 54 59 54 51 47 43 
  50 MWh -  Industrial consumers / Eurostat category 
IB 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GER 165 163 162 139 133 131 134 
BEL 147 148 148 143 125 129 122 
ITA 119 119 114 119 87 98 104 
SPA 111 100 98 98 98 99 95 
FRA 100 92 89 87 85 86 83 
U-K 114 109 107 107 94 92 78 
  3.5 MWh -  Domestic consumers / Eurostat category 
DC 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ITA 167 168 157 150 157 139 147 
GER 127 126 128 119 122 126 125 
BEL 119 119 118 117 118 114 112 
U-K 108 105 102 99 96 97 95 
FRA 101 96 95 93 91 92 89 
SPA 105 95 93 90 86 86 87 
Source: European Commission DG TREN, 3d Benchmarking Report (March 
2004) 
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Table 8. EU Estimated breakdown of expected consumers prices 2004 (Euros 
/ MWh) 
 
(24GWH) Industrial consumers Eurostat category IG 
 Power Grid Costs Supply Margin TOTAL 
ITA 60  13  10  83 € 
BEL 40  25  8  73 € 
GER 35  25  10  70 € 
FRA 28  15  10  53 € 
SPA 38  10  5  53 € 
U-K 30  15  5  50 € 
(50MWH) Industrial consumers Eurostat category IB 
 Power Grid Costs Supply Margin TOTAL 
GER 40 65 20 125 € 
ITA 60 30 25 115 € 
BEL 45 50 20 115 € 
SPA 40 45 10 95 € 
FRA 30 50 10 90 € 
U-K 33 35 10 78 € 
Source: European Commission DG TREN, 3d Benchmarking Report (March 
2004) 
Table 9. Margin between Domestic and Industrial Prices (in euros per MWh) 
   Price (DC =3.5 MWh) - 
(IG=24GWh) 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ITA 108 108 104 90 78 68 70 
GER 59 60 65 69 69 73 65 
BEL 61 63 63 62 61 56 56 
U-K 48 51 43 45 45 50 52 
FRA 46 44 45 44 43 43 44 
SPA 46 43 40 36 37 39 39 
Source: Own calculation on EU data 
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Table 10. French TSO scenarios 2010-2020 
French Consumption Growth Rate (Yearly %) 
Until     2010  2010-2015  2015-2020 
Scenario R1       1.4 0.9 0.6 
Scenario R2       1.3 0.9 0.5 
Scenario R3       1.1 0.6 0.3 
   French Consumption (in TWh) 
Year      2010  2015  2020 
Scenario R1       520 544 561 
Scenario R2       513 536 550 
Scenario R3       503 519 527 
Source: Bilan prévisionnel RTE (2006 – 2015) 
Figure 3. French nuclear generation capacity from 2016 to 2039 assuming a 







































































































































Operational nuclear generation capacity (GW/Year) Nuclear capacity shut down (GW/Year)
 
Source: CEA (2003) 
